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Abstract. We adopt the decision-theoretic principle of expected utility maximization as a paradigm for
designing autonomous rational agents, and present a framework that uses this paradigm to determine
the choice of coordinated action. We endow an agent with a specialized representation that captures
the agent’s knowledge about the environment and about the other agents, including its knowledge about
their states of knowledge, which can include what they know about the other agents, and so on. This
reciprocity leads to a recursive nesting of models. Our framework puts forth a representation for the
recursive models and, under the assumption that the nesting of models is finite, uses dynamic program-
ming to solve this representation for the agent’s rational choice of action. Using a decision-theoretic
approach, our work addresses concerns of agent decision-making about coordinated action in unpre-
dictable situations, without imposing upon agents pre-designed prescriptions, or protocols, about stan-
dard rules of interaction. We implemented our method in a number of domains and we show results
of coordination among our automated agents, among human-controlled agents, and among our agents
coordinating with human-controlled agents.
Keywords: coordination; rationality; decision theory; game theory; agent modeling
1. Introduction
In systems involving multiple agents, system builders have traditionally analyzed the
task domain of interest and, based on their analyses, imposed upon the agents cer-
tain rules (laws, protocols) that constrain the agents into interacting and communi-
cating according to patterns that the designer deems desirable. Thus, research into
coordination techniques has often led to prescriptions for task-sharing protocols,
such as the Contract Net [73], for rules of interaction such as social laws [71], for
negotiation conventions [67], and so on. The emphasis in this prior work has been
to provide the agents with ready-to-use knowledge that guides their interactions,
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so that their coordination achieves certain properties desirable from the designer’s
point of view, such as conflict avoidance, stability, fairness, or load balancing.
The fundamental problem we address in this paper, on the other hand, is how
agents should make decisions about interactions in cases where they have no com-
mon pre-established protocols or conventions to guide them.1 Our argument is that
an agent should rationally apply whatever it does know about the environment and
about the capabilities, desires, and beliefs of other agents to choose (inter)actions
that it expects will maximally achieve its own goals. While this kind of agent descrip-
tion adheres to the knowledge-level view (articulated by Newell [56]) that is a cor-
nerstone of artificial intelligence, operationalizing it is a complex design process.
Our work, as discussed in this paper, contributes to formalizing a rigorous, com-
putational realization of an agent that can rationally (inter)act and coordinate in
a multi-agent setting, based on knowledge it has about itself and others, without
relying on protocols or conventions.
In our work, we use the normative decision-theoretic paradigm of rational
decision-making under uncertainty, according to which an agent should make deci-
sions so as to maximize its expected utility [17, 20, 23, 32, 40, 68]. Decision theory is
applicable to agents interacting with other agents because of uncertainty: The abil-
ities, sensing capabilities, beliefs, goals, preferences, and intentions of other agents
clearly are not directly observable and usually are not known with certainty. In deci-
sion theory, expected utility maximization is a theorem that follows from the axioms
of probability and utility theories [24, 53]. In other words, if an agent’s beliefs about
the uncertain environment conform to the axioms of probability theory, and its
preferences obey the axioms of utility theory (see, for example, [68, p. 474]), then
the agent should choose its actions so as to maximize this expected utility.2
The expected utilities of alternative courses of action are generally assessed based
on their expected results. Intuitively, an agent is attempting to quantify how much
better off it would be in a state resulting from it having performed a given action.
In a multi-agent setting, however, an agent usually cannot anticipate future states
of the world unless it can hypothesize the actions of other agents. Therefore, it
may be beneficial for the agent to model other agents influencing its environment
to assess the outcomes and the utilities of its own actions. We say that an agent is
coordinating with other agents precisely when it considers the anticipated actions of
others as it chooses its own action.
An agent that is trying to determine what the other agents are likely to do may
model them as rational as well, thereby using expected utility maximization as a
descriptive paradigm.3 This, in turn, leads to the possibility that they are similarly
modeling other agents in choosing their actions. In fact, depending on the available
information, this nested modeling could continue on to how an agent is modeling
other agents that are modeling how others are modeling, and so on.
Thus, to rationally choose its action in a multi-agent situation, an agent should
represent the, possibly nested, information it has about the other agent(s), and uti-
lize it to solve its own decision-making problem. This line of thought, that combines
decision-theoretic expected utility maximization with reasoning about other agent(s)
that may reason about others, leads to a variant of game theory that has been called
a decision-theoretic approach to game theory [3, 7, 41, 62]; we will compare it to
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traditional game theory further in Section 6. We would also like to remark that
there are several ways in which the agent can avoid explicit representation and rea-
soning with all of its knowledge each time it needs to make a decision. Some of
these methods of bounding the agent’s rationality compile the available information
into, say condition-action rules, while some neglect information that cannot change,
or is unlikely to change, the solution to the decision-making problem at hand. We
outline some of these approaches in Section 7.
To help the reader put our work in perspective, we should stress that the rep-
resentations we postulate here are only used for the purpose of decision-making
in multi-agent situations; we do not postulate a general knowledge-representation
and reasoning formalism. Thus, the representations we discuss are invoked only
when there is a need for making a decision about which course of action to pur-
sue, and our methods use many of the other components constituting a full-fledged
autonomous agent. These usually include a suitably designed knowledge base con-
taining a declarative representation of information about the environment and the
other agents,4 sensing and learning routines that update the KB, planning routines
that propose alternative courses of action, and so on. This paper does not address
any of the difficult challenges posed by learning, sensing and planning; we concen-
trate solely on the issue of decision-making, understood as choosing among alter-
native courses of action enumerated, for example, by a symbolic planning system,
using the information available in the knowledge base.
In the next section, we introduce an example of recursive modeling, while
Section 3 formally presents the Recursive Modeling Method’s (RMM) repre-
sentation of nested knowledge and its solution concept. Section 4 illustrates the
solution method through an example. We then report on a number of coordina-
tion experiments (Section 5), contrast RMM to other relevant work (Section 6),
and discuss the complexity issues (Section 7). We conclude by summarizing RMM’s
contributions and open research problems (Section 8).
2. An example of recursive modeling
The main goal of our method is to represent and reason with the relevant infor-
mation that an agent has about the environment, itself, and other agents, in order
to estimate expected utilities for its alternative courses of action, and thus to make
a rational decision in its multi-agent situation. To choose an action that maximizes
its individual utility, an agent should predict the actions of others. The fact that an
agent might believe that other agents could be similarly considering the actions of
others in choosing an action gives rise to the recursive nesting of models.
For the purpose of decision-making, RMM compactly folds together all of the
relevant information an agent might have in its knowledge base, and summarizes
the possible uncertainties as a set of probability distributions. This representation
can reflect uncertainty as to the other agents’ intentions, abilities, preferences, and
sensing capabilities. Furthermore, on a deeper level of nesting, the agents may have
information on how other agents are likely to view them, how they themselves think
they might be viewed, and so on.
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To facilitate the analysis of the decision-making behavior of the agents involved,
the relevant information on each of the recursive levels of modeling is represented
in RMM as a set of payoff matrices. In decision theory and game theory, payoff
matrices have been found to be powerful and compact representations, fully sum-
marizing the current contents of an agent’s model of its external environment, the
agent’s capabilities for action in this environment, the relevant action alternatives
of the other agents involved, and finally, the agent’s preferences over the possible
joint actions of the agents.
Given a particular multi-agent situation, a payoff matrix can be constructed from
the information residing in the KB by various means. For example influence dia-
grams, widely used in the uncertainty in AI community, can be compiled into unique
payoff matrices by summarizing the dependence of the utility of agent’s actions on
the environment and on others’ actions. Other methods include equipping prob-
abilistic or classical planners with multiattribute utility evaluation modules, as in
the work reported in [32, 36], and in our early system called Rational Reasoning
System (RRS) [29], which combined hierarchical planning with a utility evaluation
to generate the payoff matrices in a nuclear power plant environment. A similar
method of generating payoff matrices is used in the air-defense domain we report
on in Section 5. Because, as we mentioned, RMM is independent of methods used
to generate payoff matrices in a specific domain, we do not consider these issues in
much depth in this paper.
To put our description of RMM in concrete terms, we consider a particular
decision-making situation encountered by an autonomous outdoor robotic vehicle,
called R1 (Figure 1), attempting to coordinate its actions with another robotic vehi-
cle, R2. We assume that the vehicles’ task is to gather as much information about
their environment as possible, for example by moving to vantage points that com-
mand a wide view, while minimizing the cost of motion itself. From the perspective
Figure 1. Example Scenario of Interacting Agents.
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of robot R1, whose point of view we take in analyzing this situation, two possi-
ble vantage points P1 and P2 are worth considering. P2 has a higher elevation and
would allow twice as much information to be gathered as P1, and so, the robot is
willing to incur greater cost to go to P2. Based on domain-specific knowledge, in
this example R1 expects that gathering information at P2 is worth incurring a cost
of 4 (or, put another way, the information gathered from P2 has an expected value
of 4), while the observation from P1 is worth 2.
R1 thus has three possible courses of action: it can move to P1 and gather infor-
mation there (action a11); it can move to P2 and gather information there (a
1
2); or
it can do neither and just sit still (a13).
5 The expected cost (time or energy) to R1
of pursuing each of these courses of action is proportional to the distance traveled,
yielding a cost of 1 for a11, 2 for a
1
2, and 0 for a
1
3. We further assume in this exam-
ple that each of the robots can make only one observation, and that each of them
benefits from all information gathered (no matter by which robot), but incurs cost
only based on its own actions.
Given that the above information resides in robot R1’s knowledge base, R1 can
build a payoff matrix that summarizes the information relevant to its decision-
making situation. The relevant alternative behaviors of R2 that matter are labeled
a21 through a
2
3, and correspond to R2’s alternative plans of taking the observation
from point P1, P2, and staying put, respectively. Thus, the entry in the matrix cor-
responding to R1’s pursuing its option a
1
1 and R2’s pursuing a
2
2 is the payoff for R1
computed as the total value of the information gathered by both robots from P1
and P2 minus R1’s own cost: 2 + 4 − 1 = 5. The payoff to R1 corresponding to
R1’s pursuing a
1
1 and R2’s pursuing a
2
1 is 2+ 0 − 1 = 1, since the information gath-
ered is worth 2 and redundant observations add no value. All of the payoffs can be
assembled in the payoff matrix depicted on top of the structure in Figure 2.
In order to arrive at the rational decision as to which of its three options to
pursue, R1 has to predict what R2 will do. If R2 were to take the observation from
the point P2, i.e., its a22 option, it would be best for R1 to observe from P1. But if
R2 decided to stay put, R1 should observe from the point P2, i.e., pursue its option
a12. In general, R1 might be uncertain as to which action R2 will take, in which
case it should represent its conjecture as to R2’s action as a probability distribution
over R2’s possible alternative courses of action. If R1 thinks that R2 attempts to
maximize its own expected utility, then R1 can adopt the intentional stance toward
R2 [19], treat R2 as rational, and model R2’s decision-making situation using payoff
matrices. R2’s payoff matrix, if it knows about both observation points, arrived at
analogously to R1’s matrix above, has the form depicted in the middle branch in
Figure 2.
That is not all, though, because R1 realizes that robot R2 possibly does not know
about the observation point P2 due to the trees located between R2 and P2. R1,
therefore, has to deal with another source of uncertainty: There is another alterna-
tive model of R2’s decision-making situation. If R2 is unaware of P2, then it does not
consider combinations of actions involving a12 or a
2
2 and its payoff matrix is 2 × 2,
as depicted in the left branch in Figure 2. The third model, in the right branch
in Figure 2, represents the possibility that neither of the other two models of R2’s
rational decision-making are correct. In this example, we assumed that R1 does not
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Figure 2. Recursive model structure depicting R1’s decision-making situation in example 1.
have any other information that it could use to model R2, and the third model is a
no-information model. We elaborate on it further below.
R1 can represent its uncertainty as to which of the models of R2 is correct by
assigning a subjective belief to each. In this example, we assume that R1, having
knowledge about the sensors available to R2 and assessing the density of the foliage
between R2 and P2, assigns a probability 0.1 to R2’s being rational and seeing
through the trees and a probability of 0.8 to it being rational but not being able to
see P2. The remaining no-information model, which includes the possibility of R2’s
being irrational, is assigned the probability of 0.1 (in [31, 74] we show how these
models and their probabilities can be learned and updated based on the other
agent’s observed behavior).
Let us note that R2’s best choice of action, in each of the intentional models that
R1 has, also depends on what it, in turn, thinks that R1 will do. Thus, R1 should, in
each of these models, represent what it knows about how R2 models R1. If it were
to model R1 as rational as well, the nesting of models would continue. R2 might
have some subjective probabilities over R1’s actions, based on a simplified model
of R1 or on past experiences with R1. This would mean that the nesting terminates
in what we call a sub-intentional model. If, on the other hand, R2 were to lack the
information needed to build a model of R1’s preferences over joint actions, then
the nesting of models would terminate with other no-information models.
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To keep this example simple and illustrative, let us make some arbitrary assump-
tions about how R1’s state of knowledge terminates, as follows: in the case that R1
supposes that R2 is of the type6 that cannot see through the trees, then R1 knows
that R2 does not know anything about R1. But in the event that R2 is of the type
that can see through the trees, then R1 itself has no knowledge in its knowledge
base about how it might be modeled by R2.
The scenario used here is relatively simple, but we invite the reader to develop his
or her own intuitions at this point by considering the problem facing our robot R1:
What is the best course of action, given the information R1 has about the situation
and about R2? Should R1 move to P1 and hope that R2 will cooperate by observing
from P2? Or should R1 go to P2 itself, due to the importance of this observation
and in the face of uncertainty as to R2’s behavior? How does the probability of R2’s
knowing about P2 influence R1’s choice? We provide the answers in Section 4.
The no-information models that terminate the recursive nesting in our example
are at the leaves of the recursive model structure in Figure 2. These models rep-
resent the limits of the agent’s knowledge: The model No-Info2 represents the fact
that, in the case when R2 cannot see P2, R1 knows that R2 has no knowledge that
would allow it to model R1. Thus, the uncertainty is associated with R2, and the
model’s superscript specifies that the state of no information is associated with its
ancestor on the second level of the structure in Figure 2. The No-Info1 model ter-
minating the middle branch of the recursive structure represents R1’s own lack of
knowledge (on the first level of the structure) of how it is being modeled by R2, if
R2 can see through the trees. In general, the no-information models can represent
knowledge limitations on any level: the limitations of R1’s own knowledge,7 R1’s
knowing the knowledge limitations of other agents, and so on.
Figure 3 illustrates the semantics of the no-information models depicted in
Figure 2. The no-information model No-Info1 in the middle branch means that R1
has no information about how it is modeled by R2. Therefore, all of the conjectures
that R2 may have about R1’s behavior are possible and, according to the principle
of indifference [16, 55], equally likely. This can be represented as the branch on
the first level of the recursive structure splitting into infinite sub-branches, each
of which terminates with a different, legal probability distribution describing R2’s
conjecture about R1’s behavior. Cumulative probability of all of the sub-branches
remains the same (0.1 in this example).8 According to this interpretation, the
No-Info1 model in the middle branch in Figure 2 is simply a shorthand notation
for the more explicit representation depicted in Figure 3.
The no-information model No-Info1 in the right branch in Figure 2 expresses the
fact that R1 has no other information based on which it could predict R2’s behavior.
Again, this translates into all of the legal 2-vector distributions emanating from the
model on the first level being possible and equally likely. It can be shown (see the
principle of interval constraints discussed in [55]) that the set of all of these legal dis-
tributions can be equivalently represented by a uniform distribution over R2’s pos-




3, themselves: 1/3; 1/3; 1/3. This distribution precisely
represents R1’s lack of knowledge in this case, since its information content is zero.
The no-information model No-Info2 in the left branch in Figure 2 is similar but
more complicated. It expresses the fact that R1 knows that if R2 cannot see P2 then
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Figure 3. Semantics of the No-Information Models in Example 1.
R2 has no information based on which it could predict R1’s behavior. This translates
into all of the legal 2-vector distributions, now emanating from the model on the
second level, being possible and equally likely. It can be equivalently represented by




3: [0.5, 0.5], as depicted in
Figure 3. The above interpretations keep an intuitive convention that branching due
to uncertainty emanates from the model of the agent that is uncertain. The middle
and right branches terminate with no-information models due to lack of knowledge
of agent R1, while the left branch terminates with No-Info2 because we assumed
that R1 knows that R2 has no information.
3. General form of the Recursive Modeling Method
In this section, we formalize the intuitions behind the recursive modeling that we
developed in the preceding section. The Recursive Modeling Method consists of
the recursive model structure that contains information the agent has in all of its
nested levels, and the solution method that uses dynamic programming to arrive at
the rational choice of an agent’s action in a multi-agent situation. The reader who
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wishes to skip the formalism for now can proceed to Section 4 where we solve the
example interaction.
3.1. Representation
We first formally define the payoff matrix, which is the basic building block of
RMM’s modeling structure. A payoff matrix represents the decision-making situa-
tion an agent finds itself in when it must choose an action to take in its multi-agent
environment. Following the definition used in game theory [63], we define the pay-
off matrix, PRi , of an agent Ri as a triple PRi = R;A;U.
R is a set of agents in the environment, labeled R1 through Rn n ≥ 1. R includes
all decision-making agents impacting the welfare of the agent Ri.
A is defined as a cross product: A = A1 × A2 × · · · × An, where set Aj =
aj1; aj2; : : : represents the alternative actions of agent Rj . The elements of A are
the joint moves of the n agents in question. We additionally define a joint move of
the other agents as an element of the following set: A−i = A1 ×A2 × · · · ×Ai−1 ×
Ai+1 × · · · ×An. The joint move of the other agents specifies the moves of all of
the agents except Ri. We further demand that the sets of alternative actions of the
agents be exhaustive, and that the alternatives be mutually exclusive.
Finally, U is a payoff function that assigns a number (expected payoff to Ri) to
each of the joint actions of all of the agents: U x A −→ R, where R is the set of
real numbers. Intuitively, a purposeful agent has reason to prefer some actions (that
further its purposes in the current situation) to others [78]. Our ability to represent
agents’ preferences over actions as payoffs follows from the axioms of utility theory,
which postulate that ordinal preferences among actions in the current situation can
be represented as cardinal, numeric values (see [13, 20] for details). We represent
Ri’s payoff associated with a joint action a1k; : : : ; aim; : : : ; anl  as uRia1k···aim···anl .
We now define the recursive model structure of agent Ri; RMSRi , as the follow-
ing pair:
RMSRi = PRi; RMRi; (1)
where PRi is Ri’s payoff matrix, and RMRi is Ri’s recursive model, which sum-
marizes the information Ri has about the other n − 1 agents in the environment.
A recursive model RMRi is defined as a probability distribution over the alterna-
tive models of the other agents. Thus, if MRi; α is taken to denote the α-th of Ri’s
alternative models of the other agents, i.e., all agents except Ri, then Ri’s recursive
model assigns to it a probability, pRiα . These probabilities represent Ri’s subjective
belief that each of the alternative models is correct. We call pRiα ’s modeling proba-




α = 1 (for the example in Figure 2 they are the
probabilities of the three branches.) To make our exposition more transparent we
have assumed above that the set of alternative models is finite, but one could gen-
eralize the modeling probability to be defined over a measurable infinite space of
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alternative models.9 Each of the alternative models of the other agents is a list of





















IntentRi; αRj —the intentional model,
No-InfoRi; α; φRj —the level-φ no-information model,
Sub-IntRi; αRj —the sub-intentional model.
(3)
The intentional model corresponds to Ri modeling Rj as a rational agent. It is
defined as:




that is, it is the recursive model structure that agent Ri ascribes to agent Rj . This
structure, as defined in Equation 1, further consists of the payoff matrix that Ri
ascribes to Rj in this model, P
Ri; α
Rj
, and the recursive model RMRi; αRj containing
the information Ri thinks Rj has about the other agents. For example, the two
models in the left and the middle branches in Figure 2 are intentional models.
The level-φ no-information model, No-InfoRi; α; φRj , represents the limits of
knowledge associated with the agent modeled on the φ level of nesting in the
branch the no-information model resides in. In other words, No-InfoRi; α; φRj
located on a level l, represents Ri’s belief that the agent modeled on level φ
has run out of knowledge at level l of Ri’s modeling structure. According to this
semantics, the superscript of the no-information model has to be between 1 (cor-
responding to the agent Ri running out of information, as in Figure 2) and a value
one less than the level on which the no-information model is located in the recur-
sive structure. Thus, for a no-information model, No-Infoφ, located on level l, we
have: 1 ≤ φ ≤ l − 1.
The no-information models assign uniform probabilities to all of the alterna-
tive distributions over the actions of the other agents and contain no information
[55] beyond the currently considered level of nesting, representing the limits of
knowledge reached at a particular stage of recursive modeling. The use of no-
information models in our decision-making framework reflects a situation in which
a symbolic KB of the agent in question contains the agent’s beliefs about the others’
beliefs nested to some level, but it does not contain any more information nested
deeper, for example because the agent did not have a chance to acquire any more
information.
The sub-intentional model is a model which does not include the ascription of
beliefs and preferences, and does not use rationality to derive behavior.10 Besides
the intentional stance, Dennett [19] enumerates two sub-intentional stances: The
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design stance, which predicts behavior using functionality (such as how the functions
of a console controller board’s components lead to its overall behavior [35]), and the
physical stance, which predicts behavior using the description of the state of what is
being modeled along with knowledge of its dynamics (like in the qualitative model
of a bouncing ball [25], or finite state automata models in [11]). These models
can be useful for an agent that can incorporate techniques such as model-based
reasoning or qualitative physics to make predictions about the behavior of sub-
intentional11 entities, resulting in a probability distribution over their alternative
behaviors, as enumerated in the agent’s payoff matrix. Further, any informative
conjecture, i.e., a probability distribution over others’ actions, can be treated as a
sub-intentional model, if it has been arrived at without ascribing rationality to the
modeled entity. For example, a conjecture as to another’s actions may be derived
from plan recognition, from past actions (as in [39]), or from information related by
a third agent, and it can be given a probabilistic weight according to the assessment
of its faithfulness within the RMM framework.
The definition of the recursive model structure and the intentional model are
recursive, but, as we argue in more detail later, it is likely to be finite due to practi-
cal difficulties in attaining infinitely nested knowledge. In other words, in represent-
ing the content of its KB about its own decision-making situation, the situations of
the other agents, and of what the other agents know about others, the agent is likely
to run out of knowledge at some level of nesting, in which case the recursion termi-
nates with a level-1 no-information model. Of course some recursive branches can
also terminate with higher level no-information models representing the possible
limitations of other agents’ knowledge, or with sub-intentional models that do not
lead to further recursion. Thus, the no-information models are not intended as an ad
hoc means to terminate the recursive structure of models. Rather, in our knowledge-
based view, the branches of the recursive structure terminate with a no-information
model when, and only when, the limits of the agents’ knowledge, contained in its
KB, are reached. In that way, all of the agent’s knowledge relevant to the decision-
making process is used to derive the rational coordinated choice of action.
3.2. Solving RMM using dynamic programming
The recursive nature of RMM makes it possible to express the solution to the
problem of choice that maximizes expected utility on a given level of modeling in
terms of the solutions to choices of the agents modeled on deeper levels. Thus,
to solve the optimization problem on one level requires solutions to subproblems
on the lower level. This means that the problem exhibits optimal substructure [18],
and that a solution using dynamic programming can be formulated. The solution
traverses the recursive model structure propagating the information bottom-up. The
result is an assignment of expected utilities to the agent’s alternative actions, based
on all of the information the agent has at hand about the decision-making situation.
The rational agent can then choose an action with the highest expected utility.
Clearly, the bottom-up dynamic programming solution requires that the recursive
model structure be finite and terminate. Thus, we make the following assumption:
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Assumption 1 The recursive model structure, defined in Equation 1, is finite and
terminates with sub-intentional or no-information models.
We should remark that the assumption above complements an assumption
that the agents possess infinitely nested knowledge, called common knowledge
or mutual knowledge, frequently made in AI and in traditional game theory.
These two assumptions lead to two solution concepts; one discussed here, which
is decision-theoretic and implemented with dynamic programming, the other one
based on the notion of equilibria. We discuss the justifiability of these assumptions
further in Section 5.
















represents Ri’s conjecture as to the joint actions of the other agents,
i.e., it is an element of the probability distribution over the set of joint moves of the
other agents A−i. We refer to p
Ri
a1k···anp
as intentional probabilities. uRi
a1k···aim···anp
is Ri’s
expected payoff residing in its payoff matrix, PRi .
Ri can determine the intentional probabilities p
Ri
a1k···anp
by using its modeling knowl-
edge of other agents contained in the recursive model RMRi . As defined in the
preceding section, Ri can have a number of alternative models MRi; α of the other
agents, and a modeling probability, pRiα , associated with each of them. If we label the
predicted probability of joint behavior of the other agents resulting from a model
MRi; α as pRi; α
a1k···anp
, we can express the overall intentional probability of the other
agents’ joint moves, pRi
a1k···anp
, as an average over all possible models (this is known






pRiα × pRi; αa1k···anp : (6)
The joint probability, pRi; α
a1k···anp
, of the other agents’ behaviors resulting from a
model MRi; α, can in turn be expressed as a product of the intentional probabilities










× · · · × pRi; αanp : (7)





indicating the expected behavior of the entity can be derived by
whatever techniques (statistical, model-based, qualitative physics, etc.) Ri has for
predicting behavior of such entities.
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If Ri has assumed an intentional stance toward Rj in its model M
Ri; α
Rj
, i.e., if it is
modeling Rj as a rational agent, then it has to model the decision-making situation
that agent Rj faces, as specified in Equations 3 and 4, by Rj ’s payoff matrix P
Ri; α
Rj






as the probability that the k-th alternative action is of the greatest utility to



























is the utility Ri estimates that Rj assigns to its alternative action a
j
k′ in this














This equation is analogous to Equation 5 except it is based on Ri’s model of
Rj . The u
Ri; α; Rj
a1o···ajk′ ···anr






a1o···anr are what Ri thinks Rj assigns to other agents’ actions.
The probabilities p
Ri; α; Rj
a1o···anr can in turn be expressed in terms of the models that Ri





The intentional stance Ri uses to model Rj is formalized in Equation 8. It states
that agent Rj is an expected utility maximizer and, therefore, its intention can be
identified as a course of action that has the highest expected utility, given Rj ’s
beliefs about the world and its preferences.
What the intentional stance does not specify is how Rj will make its choice if it
finds that there are several alternatives that provide it with the maximum payoff.
Using the principle of indifference once more, Ri assigns an equal, nonzero proba-
bility to Rj ’s option(s) with the highest expected payoff, and zero to all of the rest.12





























if ajk ∈ AmaxRi; αj
0 otherwise.
(11)
Finally, if Ri’s model terminates with a no-information model, two cases arise.
The first occurs when we have a no-information model No-Infoφ located on level
φ+ 1 describing the limits of knowledge possessed by the agent modeled on level
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φ. This model is a shorthand for all legal distributions being possible and equally
likely.13 As could be expected, it can be shown (see the principle of interval con-
straints method in [55]) that it can be equivalently represented by a uniform distri-






= 1/Aj specified in this model. The models in the leaves of the right- and
left-most branches in Figure 3 illustrate this case.
The second, more complex case, occurs when a model No-Infoφ is located on
level deeper than φ + 1. In this case we note that Equation 8 and Equation 9
define a finite number of equivalence classes among the infinite sub-branches rep-
resented by these no-information models. Namely, an intentional probability distri-
bution used in Equation 9 to compute the intentional probabilities higher up the
recursive model in Equation 8 is equivalent to another such distribution, provided
that it also favors the same alternatives chosen as optimal in Equation 8. If fol-
lows that the no-information model in this case can be equivalently represented
by a finite number (Aj at most) of discrete branches, each representing such an
equivalence class. The resulting discrete branches have a modeling probability, asso-
ciated with the equivalence classes they represent, defined on the measurable space
of possible intentional probability distributions in the leaves of the sub-branches.
These branches can be terminated with any of these equivalent distributions on the
level φ+ 1, or simply with the resulting probability distribution computed in Equa-
tion 8 on level φ. The information contained in these branches can then be propa-
gated upwards directly. We provide examples of these calculations in the following
section.
4. Solving the example interaction
In this section, we solve the example decision-making problems presented in
Section 2. We begin by replacing the infinite branching of the middle model of R2
in Figure 3 with a finite number of equivalence classes. Note that some of the prob-
ability triples in the sub-branches in Figure 3, when used to calculate the expected
utilities of R2’s actions in the matrix above make R2’s action a
2
2 the most prefer-
able, while other triples may favor other actions. For example, if R2 models R1’s
expected behavior using the probability distribution 1; 0; 0 over the actions a11,
a12, and a
1





3, according to Equation 5 are 0, 5, and 2, respectively, and the
action a22 is preferred for R2. Another distribution, say, 0:9; 0:1; 0 also favors
a22 and thus belongs to the same equivalence class as 1; 0; 0. The distribution
0:1; 0:9; 0, on the other hand, makes the action a23 preferable for R2, and belongs
to a different equivalence class.
The modeling probability of the branch representing the class favoring the action
a22 is computed as the proportion of all of the 3-vectors in Figure 3 that favor a
2
2,
among all of the legal distributions over the three actions of R1, x1; x2; x3, such
that x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 and 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, for i equal to 1 through 3. All of these
legal 3-vectors form a triangular part of a plane in the three dimensional space
spanned by the axes x1, x2, and x3. The area of this triangle can be computed
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3/2. The part of the area of the legal 3-vectors that
favor the action a22, can be computed (again, see [51]) as
√












3/32.14 Thus, two equivalence classes among the 3-vectors
that favor a22 and a
2
3 have probabilities equal to 15/16 and 1/16, respectively, and
these are the only classes that have a nonzero probability. Now, all of the sub-
branches that favor each of the separate alternative actions can be lumped into
a sub-branch ending with a single representative probability 3-vector favoring this
particular action on level 3, or simply with the intentional distribution reflecting
the favored action of agent R2 on level 2. The resulting recursive structure for our
example is depicted in Figure 4.
The recursive structure in Figure 4 can be solved with dynamic programming,
which after reaching the bottom of the structure, propagates the results upwards as
follows. The intentional probability distribution in the leftmost leaf in Figure 4—
representing R1’s knowing that R2 has no information about how to model R1’s






 = 0:5; 0:5. Given R2’s pay-
off matrix in this case, the expected utilities of its alternatives in this model are




= pR1; 1; R2
a11
× 0+ pR1; 1; R2
a13




= pR1; 1; R2
a11
× 2 + pR1; 1; R2
a13
× 0 = 1
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Since the set of R2’s alternatives that maximize its expected payoff in this
model has only one element AmaxR1; 12 = a23 the probability distribution









 = 0; 1. Thus, R1 knows that if R2 cannot see point P2 it will
remain stationary.
The probability distributions over R2’s alternatives in the remaining three
branches specify that R2 will move toward P2 and make an observation from there
(this is the case when R2 can see P2 and its model of R1 indicates that pursuing
P2 is better), with the probability of 0:1× 15/16 = 0:09375. With the probability
0:1× 1/16 = 0:00625, R2 will remain still even though it knows about P2, since its
model of R1 indicates that R1 is likely to pursue observation from P2. The remain-
ing no-information model has a probability of 0.1 and assigns equal probabilities to
all of R2’s alternative actions.
The four alternative models of R2’s behavior can be combined into the overall
intentional distribution over R2’s actions as a probabilistic mixture of R2’s inten-










0:8 × 0; 0; 1 + 0:09375 × 0; 1; 0 + 0:00625 × 0; 0; 1 + 0:1 × 1/3; 1/3; 1/3 =
0:0333; 0:1271; 0:8396.
The expected utilities of R1’s alternative actions in its own decision-making situ-












= 0:0333× 2 + 0:1271× 4+ 0:8396× 0 = 0:575
Thus, the best choice for R1 is to pursue its option a
1
2, that is, to move toward
point P2 and make an observation from there. It is the rational coordinated action
given R1’s state of knowledge, since the computation included all of the information
R1 has about agent R2’s expected behavior. Intuitively, this means that R1 believes
that R2 is so unlikely to go to P2 that R1 believes it should go there itself.
Let us note that the traditional tools of equilibrium analysis do not apply to
this example since there is no common knowledge. However, the solution obtained
above happens to coincide with one of two possible solutions that could be arrived at
by traditional game-theoretic equilibrium analysis, if a number of additional assump-
tions about what the agents know were made in this case. Thus, if R1 were to assume
that R2 knows about the point P2, and that R2 knows that R1 knows, and so on,
then R1’s move toward P2 would a part of the equilibrium in which R1 goes to P2
and R2 goes to P1. This shows that the solutions obtained in RMM analysis can
coincide with game-theoretic solutions, but that it depends on fortuitous assump-
tions about agents’ knowledge. It is also not difficult to construct a finite state of
R1’s knowledge that would result in R1’s rational action to be pursuing observation
from P1 and expecting R2 to observe from P2, which happens to be the other equi-
librium point that could be derived if the agents were assumed to have common
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knowledge [3] about P2. The coincidence would, again, be a matter of making ad
hoc assumptions about the agents’ states of knowledge.
5. Application domains and experiments
RMM fills a unique niche among multi-agent reasoning techniques based on pre-
established protocols in many realistic domains for two main reasons. First, in many
domains the environment is too variable and unpredictable for pre-established
protocols to remain optimal in circumstances that could not be foreseen by the
designers. Second, frequently, the group of interacting agents is not specified before
hand,15 and one cannot rely on the agents’ knowing which, if any, protocol to follow.
Examples include numerous human-machine coordination tasks, such as many real-
istic space applications, in which robots need the ability to interact with both other
robots and humans, as well as applications in defense-related domains, character-
ized by their inherently unpredictable dynamics. Other examples include telecom-
munications networks, flexible manufacturing systems, and financial markets.
In our work, we have looked more closely at applying RMM to coordinate
autonomous manufacturing units [30], and applications to coordination and intelli-
gent communication in human-computer interaction [28].
Finally, we have implemented RMM in three examples of multi-agent domains.
Our aim has been to assess the reasonableness of the behavior resulting from our
approach in a number of circumstances, and to assess its robustness and perfor-
mance in mixed environments composed of RMM and human-controlled agents.
Our experiments in mixed environments are intended to show the advantage of
RMM as a mechanism for coordination that relies on modeling the other agents’
rationality, as opposed to relying on coordination protocols. We briefly describe our
results below.
We should note that all of the examples of coordination below were achieved
without any communication among the RMM-based and the human-controlled
agents that participated. The results of interactions with communication are
reported in P. J. Gmytrasiewicz and E H. Durfee, “Rational Communication in
Multi-Agent Environments,” accepted for publication, AAMAS, 2000.
5.1. Coordination in the air defense domain
Our air defense domain consists of some number of anti-air units whose mission is to
defend a specified territory from a number of attacking missiles (see Figure 5). The
defense units have to coordinate and decide which missiles to intercept, given the
characteristics of the threat, and given what they can expect of the other defense
units. The utility of the agents’ actions in this case expresses the desirability of
minimizing the damage to the defended territory. The threat of an attacking missile
was assessed based on the size of its warhead and its distance from the defended
territory. Further, the defense units considered the hit probability, PH, with which
their interceptors would be effective against each of the hostile missiles. The product
of this probability and a missile threat, T; was the measure of the expected utility
of attempting to intercept the missile.
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Figure 5. MICE simulation of the air defense domain.
In this domain, it is easy to see the advantage of using decision-theoretic approach
to game theory as implemented in RMM vs. the traditional game-theoretic solution
concept of equilibria. Apart from the need for common knowledge the agents have
to share to justify equilibria (we discuss this further in Section 6), the problem is that
there may be many equilibria and no clear way to choose the “right” one to guide
the agent’s behavior. Take an example of two air defense units facing an attack by
two missiles, A and B. In their choice of which missile the agents should intercept
there are already two equilibria: One in which first agent intercepts A and second
agent intercepts B, and a another one in which first agent intercepts B and second
agent intercepts A. With the number of equilibria equal, or sometimes greater,
than the number of alternative targets the agent would be left with no guidance
as to which solution should be acted upon, and which threat should actually be
intercepted next.
In all of the experiments we ran,16 each of two defense units could launch three
interceptors, and were faced with an attack by six incoming missiles. We put all of
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the experimental runs under the following conditions. First, the initial positions of
missiles were randomly generated and it was assumed that each missile must occupy
a distinct position. Second, the warhead sizes were 470, 410, 350, 370, 420, 450
for missiles A through F, respectively. Third, the other battery was assumed to be
operational with probability 0.8, and to be incapacitated with probability 0.2. Fourth,
the performance assessments of agents with different policies were compared using
the same threat situation. Further, each interceptor could intercept only one missile
and it was moving twice as fast as the incoming missile. Finally, although there was
no communication between agents, each agent could see which threat was shot at
by the other agent and use this information to make its next decision.
Our experiments were aimed at determining the quality of modeling and coor-
dination achieved by the RMM agents in a team, when paired with human agents,
and when compared to other strategies. To evaluate the quality of the agents’ per-
formance, the results were expressed in terms of (1) the number of intercepted
targets, i.e., targets the defense units attempted to intercept, and (2) the total
expected damage to friendly forces after all six interceptors were launched. The
total expected damage is defined as a sum of the residual warhead sizes of the
attacking missiles. Thus, if a missile was targeted for interception, then it con-
tributed 1 − PH × Size to the total damage. If a missile was not targeted, it
contributed all of its warhead size to the expected damage.
The target selection strategies are as follows:
• Random: selection randomly generated.
• Independent, no modeling: selection of arg maxjPHij × Tj for agent i.
• Human17: selection by human.
• RMM: selection by RMM.
The random agents were included to provide the worst-case base line of the
system performance in our experiments. We included the independent agents to
show what coordination can be expected when agents maximize but do not model
each other in making their choices. We experimented with the above policies to
understand the agent interactions in two groups: heterogeneous teams of agents
with the same policy and the mixed agent teams with different policies.
As shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, we found that the all-RMM team outper-
formed the human and independent teams. The average number of intercepted
targets by the all-RMM team during 100 trials was 5.49 σ18SX = 0:05, compared
to 4.89 σSX = 0:08 for the independent team and 4.77 σSX = 0:06 for the all-
human team. Further, the RMM-controlled coordinated defense resulted in the
total expected damage of 488.0 σSX = 23:4, which was much less than that of
the independent team (732.0, σSX = 37:1) and that of the all-human team (772.0,
σSX = 36:3).
We found that the human performance was very similar to the performance
of independent agents. The most obvious reason for this is that humans tend to
depend on their intuitive strategies for coordination, and, in this case, found it hard
to engage in deeper, normative, decision-theoretic reasoning. Sometimes the ways
human subjects chose a missile were different and quite arbitrary. Some of them
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Figure 6. Average number of intercepted targets (over 100 runs).
attempted to intercept the 3 left-most or right-most missiles, depending whether
they were in charge of the left or the right defense battery. This led to difficulties
when the missiles were clustered at the center area and to much duplicated effort.
Others tended to choose missiles with the largest warhead size. Still others tried
to consider the multiplication of the missile size and the hit probability, but did
not model the other agent appropriately. The performance of the RMM team was
not perfect, however, since the agents were equipped with limited and uncertain
knowledge of each other.
The performance of the heterogeneous teams again suggests the favorable qual-
ity of coordination achieved by RMM agents. Comparing a heterogeneous team
with a homogeneous team, the average number of intercepted targets for the
RMM-Human team was 5.10 σSX = 0:04, and for all-human team 4.77; 4.98
σSX = 0:03 for the RMM-Independent team vs. 4.89 for the Independent team;
4.66 σSX = 0:06 for the RMM-Random team is, and 3.77 for the all-Random team.
In order to test whether the observed differences among the target selection
strategies were not due to chance, we used an analysis of variance with a 0.01 signif-
icance level. Here, the all-human team and the RMM-Human team were left out,
because of the relatively small number of participating human subjects.19 In the
experiment in which the number of intercepted targets was measured (Figure 6),
F4;∞ = 4:12, p < 0:01. Therefore, we can conclude that the differences among
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Figure 7. Average total expected damage (over 100 runs).
the five target selection strategies are not due to chance with the probability 99%.
This result holds also for the experiment in which the total expected damage
was measured. To test the significance of the observed superiority of coordination
achieved by the RMM team vs. the other non-human teams, t tests were performed.
The results show that the RMM team was better than any other team with the
probability of 99% (0.01 level of significance).
The above results show that RMM allows the automated agents to achieve
high quality coordination in this unpredictable environment without relying on
predefined protocols. As we argued, methods using traditional game-theoretic equi-
libria would not be sufficient to coordinate agents in our domain. A particularly
promising facet of our results is that the Recursive Modeling Method is a robust
mechanism for modeling and coordination not only among RMM agents, but also
with the human-controlled agents.
5.2. Coordination in the pursuit problem
The pursuit problem is usually described as one during which four agents, called
predators, have to coordinate their movements to pursue, surround, and capture the
fifth agent, called prey (see Figure 8). Our RMM implementation of the predators’
decision-making uses the evaluation of expected utility of alternative positions of
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Figure 8. Predator-prey coordination game simulated in MICE.
the agents, resulting from their alternative moves, including the factors of how close
the agents are to the prey, and how well the prey is surrounded and blocked off, as
discussed in [49]. The expected utilities of alternative moves were then assembled
into payoff matrices and used by the RMM agents in recursive model structures
that are assumed to end on the fifth level with no-information models.
In this domain we ran five sets of experiments, each consisting of five runs intial-
ized by a randomly generated configuration of predators and prey. The five sets of
runs contained different numbers of RMM and human agents, and typical runs in
each set can be viewed at http://dali.uta.edu/Pursuit.html.
Using the time-to-capture as the measure of quality of the coordination among
predators, we found that the best results were obtained by the all-human team (aver-
age time-to-capture of about 16 time units), followed by the all RMM team (average
time-to-capture about 22 units), with the mixed RMM-human teams exhibiting the
times of about 24 time steps (typical standard deviation for a set was 3.8). How-
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ever, a statistical significance test (ANOVA) shows that the differences in the results
obtained were not statistically significant; the difference in performance was not due
to chance with probability less than 0.95.
Thus, the RMM-controlled agents were fairly competent in coordinating, but
did not perform as well as human subjects. We think that the high quality results
obtained by humans can be explained by the highly visual character of the task.
Humans made their choices by eyeing the screen and choosing their actions based
on how best to surround the prey. RMM agents, of course, did not have the advan-
tage of visual input.
5.3. Cooperative assembly domain
We simulated a cooperative assembly task, characteristic of many space and manu-
facturing applications, using the blocks world in which the agents were to assemble
the blocks into simple given configurations. In this domain, again, we tested the
behavior of RMM agents when paired off with other RMM and human agents. The
point was to observe the agents properly dividing the tasks of picking up various
blocks, and not wasting the effort in attempting to pick up the same blocks. We have
not performed rigorous analysis of performance achieved by agents in this domain
but the reader can find the typical runs on http://dali.uta.edu/Blocks.html.
In summary, our experiments in the three domains above provide a promising
confirmation of the ability of the RMM alogorithm to achieve coordination among
agents in unstructured environments with no pre-established coordination proto-
cols. We found the behavior of RMM agents to be reasonable and intuitive, given
that there was no possibility of communication. RMM agents were usually able
to predict the behavior of the other agents, and to successfully coordinate with
them. Given the nature of the application domains we outlined earlier and the
frequent need for competence in interactions with humans, we find the experi-
ments involving a heterogeneous mix of RMM and human participants particularly
promising.
6. Related work
Some of the most relevant works are ones that bear upon our Assumption 1 in
Section 3.2, postulating finiteness of knowledge nesting in the recursive model
structure.20 A well-known particular case of infinitely nested knowledge is based
on the notion of common knowledge [2]. A proposition, say p, is common knowl-
edge if and only if everyone knows p, and everyone knows that everyone knows
p, and everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows p, and so on ad
infinitum. However, in their well-known paper [34], Halpern and Moses show that,
in situations in which agents use realistic communication channels which can lose
messages or which have uncertain transmission times,21 common knowledge is not
achievable in finite time unless agents are willing to “jump to conclusions,” and
assume that they know more than they really do.22
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In other related work in game theory, researchers have begun to investigate the
assumptions and limitations of the classical equilibrium concept [5, 26, 41, 64, 76].
As we mentioned, our work on RMM follows an alternative approach, proposed
in [3, 7, 41, 62], and called a decision-theoretic approach to game theory. Unlike
the outside observer’s point of view in classical equilibrium analysis, the decision-
theoretic approach takes the perspective of the individual interacting agent, with its
current subjective state of belief, and coincides with the subjective interpretation of
probability theory used in much of AI (see [12, 55, 59] and the references therein).
Its distinguishing feature seems best summarized by Myerson ([53, Section 3.6]):
The decision-analytic approach to player i’s decision problem is to try to predict the behav-
ior of the players other than i first, and then to solve i’s decision problem last. In contrast,
the usual game-theoretic approach is to analyze and solve the decision problems of all
players together, like a system of simultaneous equations in several unknowns.
Binmore [5] and Brandenburger [7] both point out that unjustifiability of common
knowledge leads directly to the situation in which one has to explicitly model the
decision-making of the agents involved given their state of knowledge, which is
exactly our approach in RMM. This modeling is not needed if one wants to talk only
of the possible equilibria. Further, Binmore points out that the common treatment
in game theory of equilibria without any reference to the equilibrating process that
achieved the equilibrium23 accounts for the inability of predicting which particular
equilibrium is the right one and will actually be realized, if there happens to be
more than one candidate.24
The definition of the recursive model structure we presented is also closely related
to interactive belief systems considered in game theory [3, 37, 52]. Our struc-
tures are somewhat more expressive, since they also include the sub-intentional
and no-information models. Thus, they are able to express a richer spectrum of
the agents’ decision making situations, including their payoff functions, abilities,
and information they have about the world, but also the possibility that other
agents should be viewed not as intentional utility maximizers, but as mechanisms or
simple objects.
Apart from game theory we should mention related work in artificial intelligence.
In his philosophical investigations into the nature of intentions Bratman [8] distin-
guishes between mere plans, say as behavioral alternatives, and mental states of
agents when they “have a plan in mind” which is relevant for having an intention
(see also [1]). Our approach of viewing intentions as the results of rational delib-
erations over alternatives for action, given an agent’s beliefs and preferences, is
clearly very similar. Closely related is also the concept of practical rationality in
[61]. Another strand of philosophical work that we follow, as we have mentioned
before, is Dennett’s formulation of the intentional stance [19], and his idea of the
ladder of agenthood (see [54] for a succinct discussion), the first five levels of which
we see as actually embodied in RMM. Somewhat related to RMM is the familiar
minimax method for searching game trees [57]. However, game tree search assumes
turn taking on the part of the players during the course of the game and it bottoms
out when the game terminates or at some chosen level, while RMM addresses
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agent’s choice without observing the other agents’ moves and it bottoms out when
there is no more knowledge.
Shoham’s agent-oriented programming (AOP) [71] takes more of a programming-
language perspective. Shoham defines many mental attitudes, for example belief,
obligation, and choice, as well as many types of messages that the agents can
exchange, and he has developed a preliminary version of an interpreter. However,
while Shoham has proposed it as an extension, decision-theoretic rationality has not
yet been included in AOP.
The issue of nested knowledge has also been investigated in the area of
distributed systems [22] (see also [21]). In [22] Fagin and colleagues present
an extensive model-theoretic treatment of nested knowledge which includes a
no-information extension (like the no-information model in RMM) to handle the
situation where an agent runs out of knowledge at a finite level of nesting; however,
no sub-intentional modeling is envisioned. Further, they do not elaborate on any
decision mechanism that could use their representation (presumably relying on cen-
trally designed protocols). Another related work on nested belief with an extensive
formalism is one by Ballim and Wilkes [4]. While it concentrates on mechanisms
for belief ascription and revision, primarily in the context of communication, it
does not address the issues of decision making. Korf’s work on multi-agent deci-
sion trees considers issues of nested beliefs, where the beliefs that agents have
about how each evaluates game situations can vary [46]. Tambe describes another
interesting approach to coordinating agents during team activities in [75].
The applications of game-theoretic techniques to the problem of interactions in
multi-agent domains have also received attention in the Distributed AI literature,
for example in [65, 66, 67]. This work uses the traditional game-theoretic concept
of equilibrium to develop a family of rules of interaction, or protocols, that would
guarantee the properties of the system as a whole that are desirable by the designer,
like stability, fairness and global efficiency. Other work by Koller and Pfeffer [44]
on games with imperfect information, Wellman’s WALRAS system [79, 80], and
Sandholm work on coalitions [70] also follow the more traditional lines of equilib-
rium analysis.
7. Complexity
One look at the branching nested representations proposed in this paper is enough
to suggest that complexity may become an issue. Indeed, if we were a characterize
the size of a problem for RMM to solve by the number of agents, n, it is easy to show
that the complexity of building and solving the recursive models grows exponentially
as OAn ∗ml, where A is the number of alternative actions considered, m is the
branching factor of the recursive model structure, and l is the level of nesting of
the model structure.
Luckily, an exhaustive evaluation of the full-blown RMM hierarchy can be simpli-
fied in a number of ways. For lack of space, we briefly list some of the most intuitive
methods (see [27] and the more recent [58] for more details). First, the dynamic pro-
gramming solution of the recursive model structure takes advantage of the property
344 gmytrasiewicz and durfee
of overlapping subproblems (see [18, Section 16.2]), which avoids repeated redun-
dant solutions of branches with the same form in the recursive model structure.
The extent to which problems do overlap, is, of course, case dependent. However,
in environments like the pursuit problem, described in Section 5, the overlap in
subproblems leads to reducing complexity down to a polynomial.
A powerful idea for further reducing the complexity of agent coordination in
large groups is to neglect the models of agents with which the interaction is weak.
First, it can be shown that models of some agents can be safely neglected, since
they possibly cannot change the solution for the best alternative. Second, some
models that potentially could influence the solution will do so with only a very
small probability. This family of simplifications and approximations is clearly similar
to strategies of coordinating humans; we usually worry about the people in our
immediate vicinity and about the few persons we interact with most closely, and
simply neglect the others within, for example, the building, organization, or the
society at large. As it turns out, the payoff matrices lend themselves to an efficient
assessment of the strength of interaction between agents by analyzing variability of
the payoff values. For details of these and other simplification methods, see [27, 58,
77], and related work in [60, 69].
8. Summary and conclusions
The starting point for our explorations in this paper has been the presumption that
coordination should emerge as a result of rational decisions in multi-agent situa-
tions, where we defined rationality as maximization of expected utility. We argued
that decision-theoretic rationality is applicable to multi-agent interactions since the
agents have to make choices under uncertainty: The abilities, sensing capabilities,
beliefs, goals, preferences, and intentions of other agents are not directly observable
and usually are not known with certainty. Thus, we used decision-theoretic ratio-
nality as a normative paradigm, describing how an agent should make decisions in
an uncertain multi-agent environment.
Further, we used expected utility maximization as a descriptive paradigm, to
model other rational agents in a multi-agent environment. We have documented
how our exploration naturally brings us to concepts from game theory, but our con-
cern with providing a decision-making apparatus to an individual agent, rather than
providing an observer with analytical tools, has led us away from the traditional
concern with equilibrium solutions. Instead, we use a newly proposed decision-
theoretic approach to game theory, implemented using dynamic programming. Our
agent-centered perspective, as well as our assumption that the knowledge of the
agent is finitely nested, as the two main differences between our approach in RMM
and the traditional game theoretic analysis. We argued that the solution concept
presented in this paper complements the game-theoretic solution: When the knowl-
edge of an agent is nested down to a finite level, a decision-theoretic approach
implemented using dynamic programming is applicable. When the infinitely nested
common knowledge is available the bottom-up dynamic programming is not appli-
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cable, but a fixed-point solution, corresponding to the classical Nash equilibrium,
can be sought using traditional game-theoretic methods.
Our implementation of the RMM algorithm in three multi-agent domains sup-
ports our claim that coordination emerges as a result of rational decision-making of
agents interacting when they have no pre-established protocols to guide them. We
found that the RMM agents are able to coordinate on the level comparable to that
of the human-controlled agents, and, in some cases, better. Particularly encouraging
is the ability of the RMM agents to effectively interact not only with other RMM
agents, but also with other agents and humans.
Our investigations can be extended in numerous ways. First, in practical situa-
tions, the intentional stance can be only one of the guides to the expected behav-
ior of other agents; the agents also have to be able to update models of each other
through observation and plan recognition. The challenge is in integrating the norma-
tive, intentional modeling using other’s rationality with techniques based on obser-
vation. Our work in this direction utilizes Bayesian learning, for which RMM, given
its probabilistic character, is naturally suited (see [31, 74] for recent results). Sec-
ond, we are exploring how the deeper reasoning in RMM, having been done once,
can be summarized (complied) into shallower models of other agents or heuristic
rules of interactive behavior. This means that, even in cases where an agent cannot
afford to use RMM in deciding what it should do in a time-constrained situation
and resorts to a (possibly wrong) heuristic response, an agent can revisit previous
decision situations when it has the time and use RMM to determine what the ratio-
nal response should have been. By storing this as a rule of behavior that can be
recalled when appropriate in the future (see related work on chunking [47]), RMM
can provide the basis for the accrual of rational heuristics [58].
Another important direction, and an application area, of RMM is studying ratio-
nal communicative behavior among agents involved in interactions. It turns out that
our framework allows the agents to also compute the expected utilities of alterna-
tive communicative actions they could execute. The agent’s maximizing the expected
utility of such actions leads to rational communicative behavior. We will report on
our approach, implementation and results in this area in P. J. Gmytrasiewicz and
E. H. Durfee, “Rational Communication in Multi-Agent Environments,” accepted
for publication, AAMAS, 2000.
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Notes
1. We would like to stress that our approach does not forbid that agents interact based on protocols.
However, to the extent that protocols specify the agent’s action the agent does not need to deliberate
about what to do and our approach is not applicable. If the protocol is not applicable or leaves
a number of alternatives open then the agent needs to choose, and should do so in a rational
manner.
2. Some authors have expressed reservations as to the justifiability of these axioms. See the discussions
in [50] and the excellent overview of descriptive aspects of decision theory in [10].
3. The use of expected utility maximization to predict and explain human decision making is widely
used in economics. See the overview in [10].
4. Our implementation uses a KB configured as an ontology of classes/frames and their instantiations
extended to contain uncertain information [45].
5. These courses of action could have been proposed as plausible by a symbolic planner, and each of
them may have to be further elaborated by the robot. While all possible detailed plans for these
high-level courses of action could be enumerated and represented in a payoff matrix, it is clearly
desirable to include just a few abstract actions or plans.
6. Our use of this term coincides with the notion of agent’s type introduced by Harsanyi in [37].
7. Note that we assume the agent can introspect. This amounts to the agent’s being able to detect
the lack of statements in its knowledge based that describe beliefs nested deeper than the given
level.
8. Our representation here is related to the problem of “only knowing”, discussed in [33, 48] and
related references.
9. In the next subsection we show how an infinite space of models can be transformed into an equiv-
alent finite set.
10. According to Dennett [19], such a sub-intentional agent does not even satisfy the basic requirement
of agenthood. It is simply an entity, then, rather than an agent proper.
11. That is, not following the decision-theoretic principles of rationality.
12. As we mentioned, we use the expected utility maximization as a descriptive tool. See also [9, 10].
13. The principle of indifference is applied here to the probability itself. See, for example, the discussion
in [16] Section 1.G.
14. We found the method of logic sampling to be an effective approximate way to compute the values
of the integrals here.
15. This means that the multi-agent system is open.
16. For an on-line demonstration of the air defense domain refer to the Web page http://dali.
uta.edu/Air.html.
17. We should remark that our human subjects were CSE and EE graduate students who were informed
about the criteria for target selection. We would expect that anti-air specialists, equipped with a
modern defense doctrine, could perform better than our subjects. However, the defense doctrine
remains classified and was not available to us at this point.
18. σSX denotes the standard error of the mean.
19. In our preliminary experiment there were 4 pairs of all-human teams and RMM-Human teams.
20. Here, knowledge about the world is taken as something the agent is acquiring through sensing, as
opposed to merely assuming.
21. To our best knowledge, all practically available means of communication have such imperfections.
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22. Halpern and Moses consider the concepts of epsilon common knowledge and eventual common
knowledge. However, in order for a fact to be epsilon or eventual common knowledge, other facts
have to be common knowledge within the, so called, view interpretation. See [34] for details. Also,
it has been argued that common knowledge can arise due to the agents’ copresence, and, say, visual
contact. These arguments are intuitive, but turn out to be difficult to formalize, so we treat the
issue here as open.
23. Binmore compares it to trying to decide which of the roots of the quadratic equation is the “right”
solution without reference to the context in which the quadratic equation has arisen.
24. Binmore [6], as well as others in game theory [14, 15, 42, 43] and related fields [72], suggest the
evolutionary approach to the equilibrating process. The centerpiece of these techniques lies in
methods of belief revision, which we also investigated using the RMM framework. Some of our
results are presented in [31, 74].
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